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ESSAY

Human Rights Litigation and the National Interest:
Kiobel’s Application of the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute
JONATHAN HAFETZ†

INTRODUCTION
The debate over the extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS)1 raised by Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.2
presumes an underlying tension between a state’s exercise of civil
universal jurisdiction and its national interest. Realist-based critiques
of the ATS posit that harmful consequences result when the United
States provides a civil remedy for human rights abuses that occur in
foreign territory, even where the conduct transgresses universally
recognized norms.3 These critiques maintain that ATS litigation
undermines U.S. investment in foreign countries; provokes a
backlash against the United States in affected countries while also
angering U.S. allies; and, more generally, reflects a naïve view of
international relations.4 Another common charge is that ATS

†

Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I would like to thank all
those who organized this symposium and all the symposium participants for their
observations and comments. I would like to thank Adam Steinman for his comments on an
earlier draft. I would also like to thank the Editors for their assistance.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
2. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
3. See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional
Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153 (2004) (discussing the harms
that flow from judicial involvement in foreign affairs through ATS litigation); Curtis A.
Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 473
(2001) (describing the costs of ATS litigation).
4. See Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1117, 1119–21 (2011) (summarizing critiques).
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litigation represents a form of ―plaintiff’s diplomacy‖ that interferes
with the executive’s prerogative to make foreign policy.5
In Kiobel, the Supreme Court appeared to vindicate these
concerns in holding that the presumption against extraterritoriality
applies to the ATS, thus limiting suits that may be brought under the
statute for serious human rights violations that occur in foreign
territory.6 Although the decision to adopt the presumption against
extraterritoriality was supported only by a five-Justice majority, the
Court was unanimous in concluding that the ATS did not provide for
universal jurisdiction and in recognizing that ATS suits could
potentially undermine U.S. interests.
This Essay explains how concerns about the adverse
consequences of human rights litigation underlie Kiobel’s adoption of
the presumption against extraterritorial application. It also argues,
however, that those concerns are overstated and ignore the way in
which ATS litigation can advance U.S. strategic interests. The Essay
concludes that even as Kiobel imposes a new territorial nexus
requirement, it leaves open the possibility that some consideration
may be given in future cases to how ATS suits advance U.S. interests
in determining whether the presumption against extraterritoriality is
displaced.
Part I describes how the various opinions in Kiobel are shaped
by their respective views of the impact of ATS litigation on the
United States. Part II describes the potential value of ATS litigation
for the United States—a point expressly incorporated into Justice
Breyer’s concurring opinion, which proposes an alternative
framework for determining when the ATS applies extraterritorially.
This part thus posits that the supposed conflict between what might
be termed human rights universalism and national interest realism is
overstated and that ATS litigation can promote U.S. interests even in
―foreign-cubed cases,‖ where both parties are foreign nationals and
the alleged wrongful conduct takes place abroad. Part III examines
recent Supreme Court decisions addressing the Constitution’s
extraterritorial reach in war-on-terrorism cases. These decisions
provide an additional perspective on Kiobel, highlighting the tension
5. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. AlvarezMachain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 2241, 2243 (2004) (noting critiques that ATS litigation amounts to ―plaintiff’s
diplomacy‖). See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff’s Diplomacy,
FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 102 (describing the ―plaintiff’s diplomacy‖ phenomenon).
6. Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1665.
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between the Court’s desire to retain some flexibility to adjudicate
claims of human rights violations that occur abroad and its continued
attraction to territoriality as a way of limiting the potential adverse
effect of those claims on U.S. interests. The Essay concludes that
Kiobel still leaves room for plaintiffs to argue that ATS litigation
involving human rights violations committed abroad advances U.S.
interests, where such arguments are supported by evidence of some
territorial nexus to the United States.
I.

KIOBEL AND THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY
UNDER THE ATS

After initially hearing argument in Kiobel on the issue of
corporate liability, the Supreme Court ordered reargument on the
broader question of ―[w]hether, and under what circumstances, the
[ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of
the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other
than the United States.‖7 In its decision, the Court addressed this
broader question, concluding that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to suits under the ATS. The Court thus
determined that ATS suits cannot be brought even for Sosa-specific
torts8 where those torts occur in foreign territory, unless the claims
―touch and concern the territory of the United States‖ with ―sufficient
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application.‖9 Applying this test in Kiobel, where the alleged human
rights violations occurred in Nigeria, and where the plaintiffs and
defendants were non-U.S. nationals, the Court found the defendants’
mere corporate presence in the United States insufficient to displace
the presumption against extraterritorial application.10
In opposing ATS jurisdiction in Kiobel, the defendants and
various amici had underscored the adverse foreign policy
consequences that can result when a U.S. court provides a civil
remedy for human rights violations that occur in another country.
Extraterritorial ATS actions, they maintained, expose U.S. officials
and nationals to jurisdiction by foreign states for U.S.-based conduct
and undermine U.S. commercial interests.11 Further, they rejected the
7. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.).
8. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004).
9. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
10. Id.
11. Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 51–52, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 101491).
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suggestion that federal courts can effectively manage these adverse
effects through case-specific doctrines such as international comity
and forum non conveniens.12 Only a prohibition against applying the
ATS to torts committed abroad, they argued, could avoid the harmful
foreign policy consequences associated with civil human rights
litigation in U.S. courts.13
The United States took a more nuanced position. It argued that
courts should exercise great restraint when confronting the foreign
relations and foreign policy consequences of asserting civil
jurisdiction over conduct that occurs in the territory of another
sovereign.14 In Kiobel, the potential for friction was heightened
because the defendants were incorporated in the United Kingdom and
the Netherlands, whose respective governments formally objected to
the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction.15 The U.S. government accordingly
opposed recognizing ATS actions where the suit ―challenges the
actions of a foreign sovereign in its own territory, where the
defendant is a foreign corporation of a third country that allegedly
aided and abetted the foreign sovereign’s conduct.‖16 While the
United States sought to leave the door ajar for the ATS’ possible
future extraterritorial application, it urged restraint and emphasized
the need for a connection to the United States, as in Filártiga, where
the defendant’s presence in the United States meant that the United
States might be perceived as harboring an alleged human rights
violator.
Kiobel’s adoption of the presumption against extraterritoriality
was driven by these perceived adverse foreign policy consequences.
The presumption, the Kiobel majority explained, ―serves to protect
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other
nations which could result in international discord.‖17 The
presumption against extraterritoriality has traditionally applied to

12. Id. at 49; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and
Corporate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 971, 981–82 (2004) (describing the
―formidable procedural and prudential hurdles‖ ATS plaintiffs must overcome to prevail).
13. Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 36–37, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 101491).
14. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of
Affirmance at 16–17, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
15. See id. at 17–18.
16. Id. at 21.
17. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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statutes regulating conduct.18 The ATS, by contrast, is a jurisdictional
statute, allowing federal courts to recognize causes of action based on
sufficiently well-defined norms of international law.19 The Kiobel
majority nevertheless held that the principles underlying the
presumption against extraterritoriality constrain judicial enforcement
of the ATS. The Court’s conclusion was driven by its concern about
the negative foreign policy consequences of judicial involvement.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts found that the risk of
those consequences was magnified in the context of the ATS because
―the question is not what Congress has done but instead what courts
may do‖ through their exercise of ATS jurisdiction.20 Kiobel thus
reflects a deep skepticism not only about the value of human rights
litigation to the United States, but also about judges’ ability to
enforce human rights norms without jeopardizing national interests.
The Court acknowledged that its prior decision in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain21 had placed constraints on the type of claims that
could be brought under the ATS, requiring that the claims allege
violations of international law norms that are ―specific, universal, and
obligatory.‖22 It concluded, however, that Sosa’s limitation on the
scope of possible ATS claims provided an insufficient check against
unwarranted judicial interference in foreign policy.23 Identifying a
norm, the Court said, was ―only the beginning of defining a cause of
action,‖ and judges would still need to address various other issues,
from determining who could be held liable to assessing the statute of
limitations—decisions that all carry ―significant foreign policy
implications.‖24
The Court also cited adverse foreign policy consequences in
distinguishing piracy,25 which provided the strongest historical
precedent in favor of the ATS’ extraterritorial application. Of the
three law-of-nations violations familiar to the Congress that enacted
the ATS—violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy—piracy alone typically occurred outside the

18. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (Securities
Exchange Act); Aramco, 499 U.S. at 246 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
19. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
20. Id. at 1664–65.
21. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
22. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1667.
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United States.26 Piracy, moreover, does not merely occur on the high
seas.27 The acts that constitute piracy ordinarily take place not on the
water but on a ship, which, as Justice Breyer observed, is ―like land,
in that it falls within the jurisdiction of the nation whose flag it
flies.‖28 The Kiobel majority highlighted the differential impact of
judicial enforcement of the norm against piracy. An ATS suit
involving piracy, it said, does not pose the same foreign policy
concerns as suits for other law-of-nations violations.29 Unlike ATS
suits addressing torture, extrajudicial killing, and other human rights
abuses, piracy ―does not typically impose the sovereign will of the
United States onto conduct occurring within the territory of another
sovereign,‖ and ―therefore carries less direct foreign policy
consequences.‖30
The Court further noted instances in which ATS litigation has
caused diplomatic strife. It cited, by way of example, objections by
various countries, including Canada, Germany, South Africa, and the
United Kingdom to the ATS’ extraterritorial application.31 The Court
also observed that allowing for the ATS’ extraterritorial application
would suggest that other nations could hale U.S. citizens into court
for their alleged violations of the law of nations occurring in the
United States or anywhere else in the world—a result laden with
damaging foreign policy consequences.32
The assumption that civil human rights litigation under the ATS
undermines rather than advances U.S. foreign policy and other
national interests thus pervades the majority opinion in Kiobel and
provides the rationale for its application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality. The other main rationale for the presumption
against extraterritoriality—that Congress ―ordinarily legislates with
respect to domestic, not foreign matters‖33—provided no support for
the Court’s decision since the ATS was enacted expressly with

26. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723–24.
27. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667.
28. Id. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); see also United States v.
Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820) (observing that a crime committed ―within the
jurisdiction‖ of a foreign state and a crime committed ―in the vessel of another nation‖ are
―the same thing‖).
29. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1669.
32. Id.
33. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010); see also EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 262 (1991).
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foreign matters in mind. The Court’s reasoning likely reflects the
objections to the litigation in Kiobel registered by such close U.S.
allies as the United Kingdom and Netherlands. It also suggests more
generally a skeptical view of judicial enforcement of human rights
norms through civil litigation and an assumption that such
enforcement undermines U.S. interests rather than furthering them.
Although the decision to uphold the dismissal of the ATS suit in
Kiobel was unanimous, the Court divided both on whether and how
to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality. These opinions
suggest divergent views about the potential value of ATS litigation to
the United States.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer offered a different
conception of human rights litigation, one that led him to oppose
applying the presumption of extraterritoriality to the ATS.34 Guided
in part by principles and practices of foreign relations law, Justice
Breyer identified three circumstances that would provide a basis for
ATS jurisdiction:
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the
defendant is an American national, or (3) the
defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely
affects an important American national interest, and
that includes a distinct interest in preventing the
United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of
civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other
enemy of mankind.35
Breyer’s first two categories invoke traditional international law
bases for prescriptive jurisdiction: territoriality and nationality.
Territoriality rests on a State’s authority over conduct occurring
within its borders.36 Nationality presumes a State’s interest in
exercising authority over its own citizens, whether as perpetrators or
victims, even for offenses committed outside the State’s territory.37
Breyer’s third category represents an amalgam of other
jurisdictional rationales—the ―effects‖ principle38 and protective

34. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(1) (1987).
37. Id. § 402(2).
38. Id. § 402(1)(c).
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jurisdiction39 on the one hand, and universal jurisdiction40 on the
other. The effects principle allows for the exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction over conduct outside a State’s borders based on its actual
or intended effect within the State.41 The protective principle, which
the Restatement’s commentary describes as ―a special application of
the effects principle,‖ similarly allows for the regulation of
extraterritorial conduct by non-nationals because of the threat posed
to a State’s security or to a limited class of other State interests.42
Universal jurisdiction, by contrast, rests on the nature of the offense
itself—that the particular crime is so egregious that it warrants the
exercise of jurisdiction by all States, independent of any connection
to a State’s territory, nationals, or interests.43
Breyer’s opinion bridges the traditional divide between these
jurisdictional rationales and challenges the assumption that a State is
not advancing its own interests when it exercises universal
jurisdiction. His third category suggests that providing a civil remedy
under the ATS against those who commit crimes of universal concern
furthers a distinct U.S. national interest (the protective principle) and
that failing to provide such a remedy could have a deleterious impact
on the United States (the effects principle). It thus posits that the
assertion of jurisdiction over matters of universal concern can
potentially further a State’s interests and should be exercised where it
does.
Breyer does not, however, embrace the traditional concept of
universal jurisdiction, which would provide for the assertion of
jurisdiction under the ATS solely based on the conduct itself (i.e., for
all Sosa-specific torts). Congress adopted the ATS when, as Justice
Story put it, ―No nation ha[d] ever yet pretended to be the custos
morum of the whole world.‖44 Not all exercises of universal
jurisdiction, Breyer suggests, further a nation’s interests. Breyer
instead sets forth a theory of qualified universal jurisdiction grounded
39. Id. § 402(3).
40. Id. § 404.
41. Id. § 402 cmt. d.
42. Id. § 402 cmt. f; see also Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law:
A New Rule for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 151 (2010)
(describing the effects and protective principles).
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404
cmt. a (1987).
44. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. La Jeune
Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) (Story, J.)).
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on and ultimately constrained by a State’s own interest in upholding
widely accepted norms.45 Limiting ATS jurisdiction to where
―distinct American interests‖ support judicial enforcement of
universally accepted norms, Breyer explains, would fulfill the
statute’s purpose while helping to minimize international friction.46
While Breyer’s first two categories provide bright-line rules (i.e.,
necessarily providing for ATS jurisdiction for Sosa-sufficient torts
that occur on U.S. soil or that are perpetrated by U.S. nationals), the
national interest category is more open-ended. Breyer does not
attempt to set forth a list of interests that would anchor jurisdiction
over an extraterritorial human rights tort, but he makes clear that the
list includes preventing the United States from becoming a ―safe
harbor‖ for torturers and others who violate the type of ―specific,
universal, and obligatory‖ international norms identified in Sosa.47
Thus, even as Breyer rejects the application of the presumption
against extraterritoriality, he draws upon notions of territoriality
through the safe harbor paradigm. Such a territorial nexus—one
Breyer found absent in Kiobel itself48—provides both a limitation on
the scope of ATS jurisdiction and an example of how a State’s own
interests may be implicated by its exercise.
The two other concurring opinions in Kiobel offer additional
perspectives on ATS litigation and its potential consequences. In his
brief concurrence, Justice Kennedy noted the limited nature of the
Court’s ruling, observing that the decision ―is careful to leave open a
number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation
of the Alien Tort Statute.‖49 Other cases, he said, may arise ―with
allegations of serious violations of international law principles
protecting persons‖ that are not covered by Kiobel’s ―reasoning and
holding‖ and that might require ―further elaboration and explanation‖
of the presumption against extraterritoriality.50 Kennedy’s decision to
join the majority opinion indicates that he subscribes to the majority’s
position that ATS litigation can cause adverse foreign policy
consequences and that he—unlike Breyer—believes a presumption
against extraterritoriality provides the best way to minimize this risk.
But Kennedy also suggests that the presumption might need to be
45. See id. at 1674–77.
46. Id. at 1674.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1677–78.
49. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
50. Id.
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qualified in other cases,51 including where there is a stronger nexus to
the United States and, by implication, where the foreign policy effect
of ATS jurisdiction is different than in Kiobel. Kennedy thus not only
leaves open the possibility of future ATS litigation for human rights
violations occurring abroad where the claims ―touch and concern‖
U.S. territory with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality. He also allows for the possibility that
courts might consider how future ATS litigation advances U.S.
interests in determining whether to apply the presumption.
Justice Alito wrote separately in Kiobel to explain his view of
how the presumption against extraterritoriality should operate.52
Unlike Kennedy, who opted for ambiguity, Alito sought to outline a
standard that could help answer the questions left open by what he
described as the Court’s ―narrow approach‖ and limit future ATS
cases for human rights abuses occurring abroad.53 A putative ATS
action, Alito said, would ―fall within the scope of the presumption
against extraterritoriality—and will therefore be barred—unless the
domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm
that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and acceptance
among civilized nations.‖54 Alito thus not only isolates domestic
conduct as the trigger for ATS jurisdiction, but also maintains that
this conduct must clear Sosa’s high bar of definiteness and
acceptance among civilized nations, even if the underlying offense
itself meets that requirement. Alito would therefore require that ATS
suits relying on theories of accomplice or participatory liability, such
as Kiobel, show that the domestic conduct met a Sosa-specific
international norm regardless of whether the underlying offense itself
provided a basis for ATS jurisdiction. As a result, Alito’s approach
appears to exclude consideration of the type of national-interest
calculation specifically contemplated by Breyer and left open by
Kennedy.
II. THE POTENTIAL STRATEGIC VALUE
LITIGATION UNDER THE ATS

OF

HUMAN RIGHTS

Much of the extraterritoriality debate in Kiobel presumes that
applying the ATS to conduct in foreign countries carries negative

51. See id.
52. Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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consequences for the United States. This presumption rests on a false
dichotomy between human rights universalism and national interest
realism—one in tension with the history surrounding the ATS and the
increasing link between human rights, on the one hand, and economic
development and security, on the other. As a number of scholars have
described, ATS litigation can advance U.S. interests,55 while the
various harmful scenarios invoked by rogue courts in ATS cases have
yet to materialize.56
From its inception, universal jurisdiction rested on pragmatic
considerations. The First Congress enacted the ATS against a
backdrop of concern about the inadequate vindication of international
law.57 It provided a civil remedy for a narrow set of international law
offenses that could have serious consequences in international affairs,
including war.58 Although the United States could be held responsible
for those consequences by failing to provide a remedy, the ATS was
not so limited, reflecting concerns about the wider ramifications of
the inadequate enforcement of international law.
Providing a civil remedy for universal jurisdiction offenses such
as piracy—even in the absence of a nexus to the United States—was
understood to promote the international legal order and thereby
benefit the United States. In adopting this logic, Sosa explained that
while wide acceptance of the particular norm justified the exercise of
universal jurisdiction, such jurisdiction was also supported by
assessments of the value of a federal forum to the United States.
The rise of modern ATS litigation in the aftermath of Filártiga v.
Peña-Irala59 reflects the growing power and influence of the
55. See, e.g., Knowles, supra note 4, at 1163–73 (describing the strategic benefits of
ATS litigation); Cleveland, supra note 12, at 971 (contesting the notion that the ATS
damages U.S. foreign relations or its role in advancing human rights globally); Beth
Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration’s Efforts to Limit
Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 196–204 (2004) (describing the utility
of ATS litigation for advancing human rights); see also Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing
Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity under the Alien Tort Statute Advances
Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 209–10 (2008) (maintaining that
ATS litigation does not damage U.S. foreign relations or undermine democratic reform).
56. See Knowles, supra note 4, at 1157.
57. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716–17 (2004).
58. See id. at 715. Those offenses were violation of safe conducts, infringement of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy. See id. at 724; see also Knowles, supra note 4, at 1163
(noting that ―[t]he ATS . . . owes its existence to geopolitical interests and realist ends,‖
which at the time were to ensure America’s neutrality and avoidance of European
entanglements).
59. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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international human rights movement.60 The movement rejects the
classical Westphalian system of state sovereignty, under which states
are the only actors of consequence on the international stage. It
instead maintains that international law protects the freedom and
dignity of individuals, and that the international system must hold
states accountable for the treatment of their own citizens.61 ATS
litigation also reflects the related explosion in transitional justice,
which centers on holding perpetrators accountable for past abuses.62
While transitional justice mechanisms typically focus on criminal
liability, there is an increasing interest outside the United States in
establishing civil liability based on universal jurisdiction.63
Protecting human rights is increasingly tied to advancing
security and economic development. The linkage between human
rights and collective security has roots in the UN Charter.64
Numerous other UN documents tether human rights to development,
peace, and security, and the United Nations has demonstrated its
intent during the past two decades to make human rights a priority in
its work.65 This notion that accountability for human rights violations
can promote peace and security underlies the UN Security Council’s
establishment of ad hoc criminal tribunals under its Chapter VII

60. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The Comparative
and Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 436–40 (2002) (describing the origins of
modern ATS litigation).
61. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The
Coming Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 212 (2005).
62. See Sandra Coliver et al., Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable by Using
International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary Strategies, 19
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 169, 185–86 (2005) (explaining how the ATS can serve as a ―catalyst
for the process of transitional justice in the [victim’s] home country‖).
63. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Remarks at the GJIL Symposium on Corporate
Responsibility and Alien Tort Statute, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1019, 1020 (2012) (explaining that
some European courts have allowed litigants to file tort suits for violations of human rights,
with at least one court granting recovery).
64. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3 (establishing that one of the United Nations’ purposes is
to ―achieve international co-operation in . . . promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights‖).
65. See Noëlle Quénivet, Binding the United Nations to Human Rights Norms by Way of
the Law of Treaties, 42 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 587, 596 (2010). U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1546, for example, called on ―all forces promoting the maintenance of security
and stability in Iraq to act in accordance with international law, including obligations under
international humanitarian law,‖ and also required States to support the United Nations in its
mission to ―promote the protection of human rights, national reconciliation, and judicial and
legal reform in order to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq.‖ S.C. Res. 1546, pmbl., ¶ 7(b)(iii),
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004).
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powers.66 The collective security interest in preventing atrocities by
states against their own people has been used to justify humanitarian
interventions under the emerging principle of a responsibility to
protect.67 Economic growth and stability has similarly been tied to
the protection of basic individual rights,68 particularly under rule-oflaw-based approaches.69 Human rights are important to all major
European institutions: the Council of Europe, the European Union,
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which
has described human rights protection as an integral component of
the new European security system in the twenty-first century.70 The
U.S. government frequently describes human rights as ―an essential
element of American global foreign policy.‖71
ATS litigation seeks to advance human rights by providing
victims with a federal forum for the enforcement of a subset of
sufficiently well-defined and established violations. The presumption
that the statute’s extraterritorial application will necessarily interfere
with U.S. foreign policy is at odds with the growing linkage between
human rights and security. It obscures the degree to which providing
a federal forum—even in the absence of a U.S. nexus—can further
U.S. strategic interests by promoting respect for human rights and
advancing perceptions of its commitment to the enforcement of
universally accepted norms.72

66. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 38 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995) (―The Security Council has resorted to the establishment of a judicial organ in the
form of an international criminal tribunal as an instrument for the exercise of its own
principal function of maintenance of peace and security . . . . ‖).
67. See Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect, 48 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 319, 319, 326–30 (2012). See generally INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001).
68. See, e.g., U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL
PLAN TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 110–25 (2005) (discussing the
importance of good governance, including promotion of human rights, to economic
development).
69. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 14 (2006).
70. See Alla Fedorova & Olena Sviatun, The Implementation of the Human Rights
Universality Principle in Ukraine, 16 IUS GENTIUM 405, 412 (2012).
71. Colum Lynch, U.S. to Seek Seat on U.N. Human Rights Council, Reversing Bush
Policy, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2009, at A2 (quoting Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton, announcing that the Obama administration would ―seek a seat‖ on the UN Human
Rights Council).
72. See Knowles, supra note 4, at 1168–69 (describing the potential reputational value of
compliance with international human rights law).
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Not all conflict, moreover, undermines U.S. interests. As
Professor William Dodge has observed in the anti-trust context, the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law has led in the long run to a
series of agreements between the United States and other countries
that promote cooperation, even though it has caused some short-term
friction.73 The possibility for transforming friction into cooperation is
arguably greater for ATS litigation given that the underlying norm
must be universal in nature, even if there is disagreement over the
best means of enforcing it.
III. THE CONSTITUTION’S EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION IN THE
WAR ON TERROR: ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE ON THE POTENTIAL
VALUE AND COSTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
The Supreme Court’s decisions in the Guantánamo detainee
habeas corpus cases have grappled with similar questions concerning
the strategic value of enforcing human rights norms in federal court.
In 2008, the Court held in Boumediene v. Bush74 that the habeas
corpus right guaranteed by the Constitution’s Suspension Clause
applied to Guantánamo.75 Unlike Kiobel, Boumediene involved the
extraterritorial application of a constitutional provision, and not of a
federal statute. Also unlike Kiobel, Boumediene challenged U.S.
action rather than conduct by foreign officials. The resistance to
federal jurisdiction in Boumediene thus centered more on concerns
about judicial interference with executive decision-making and
military operations than with foreign relations. Despite these
differences, Boumediene and other detainee habeas cases provide a
useful perspective on Kiobel’s treatment of extraterritoriality, the
perceived consequences of enforcing human rights norms in federal
court, and the degree to which territoriality is viewed as a constraint
on the exercise of judicial power.
Until 2008, the central question in the Guantánamo detainee
litigation concerned whether the courts could ever exercise habeas
jurisdiction over detentions outside the United States. This question
was often framed as a conflict between the individual’s right to be
free from unlawful executive imprisonment, on the one hand, and the
impropriety and risks of judicial review of executive action during
wartime, on the other. In arguing against a federal forum for review
73. William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 122 (1998).
74. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
75. Id. at 728.

7-Haftez

2013]

8/28/2013 9:24 PM

HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST

121

of executive detentions, the government relied on a combination of
two factors: alienage (the Guantánamo detainees were all noncitizens) and territoriality (Guantánamo was located outside
sovereign U.S. territory). Territoriality was thus viewed as a
limitation on the exercise of federal judicial power, which the
government argued would be detrimental to the nation’s interests.
In Rasul v. Bush,76 the Court held that the general federal habeas
statute applied to Guantánamo.77 The Court concluded that the
presumption against extraterritorial application did not apply because
of the ―complete jurisdiction and control‖ that the U.S. exercised over
the Guantánamo naval base.78 It also noted that the government
conceded that the habeas statute would extend to U.S. citizens
detained there, undermining its own argument for invoking the
presumption.79 The Court thus concluded that Guantánamo was not
extraterritorial, at least not for purposes of applying the federal
habeas statute. It did not, however, address whether any
constitutional guarantees applied to Guantánamo detainees.
After Congress eliminated the statutory basis for habeas
jurisdiction over Guantánamo detentions,80 the Court had to confront
the question of the Constitution’s application. In holding that the
Suspension Clause applied to Guantánamo,81 Boumediene rejected
the government’s argument for a categorical rule based on
territoriality and citizenship. Writing for a five-Justice majority,
Justice Kennedy adopted a functional test, which drew upon Justice
Harlan’s flexible methodology in Reid v. Covert82 and his own
concurrence in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.83 As Kennedy
explained, ―whether a constitutional provision has extraterritorial
effect depends upon the particular circumstances, the practical
necessities, and possible alternatives which Congress had before it
and, in particular, whether judicial enforcement of provision would
be impracticable and anomalous.‖84 Kennedy then distilled these
76. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
77. Id. at 481.
78. Id. at 480–81.
79. Id.
80. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
81. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 728 (2008).
82. 354 U.S. 1 (1954).
83. 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
84. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74–75 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

7-Haftez

122

8/28/2013 9:24 PM

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 28:107

general principles into a multi-factored test to determine the
extraterritorial application of the Suspension Clause. Those factors
include: ―(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the
adequacy of the process through which that status determination was
made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then
detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in
resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.‖85 Applying this test,
the Court found that the Suspension Clause ―has full effect‖ at
Guantánamo.86 While Boumediene did not address either the
application of other constitutional provisions to Guantánamo or the
application of the Suspension Clause to other U.S.-run detention
facilities, such as Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan, it
established that there was no categorical presumption against the
Constitution’s extraterritorial application.
Boumediene may be understood as a pragmatic, situationspecific approach to the problem of Guantánamo. But it also suggests
a recognition that enforcement of fundamental individual rights in
federal court can advance U.S. strategic interests. Kennedy
acknowledged the risks that judicial review of wartime detentions
could potentially pose and urged judges to exercise caution and
appropriate deference to executive branch officials in considering
detainee habeas petitions.87 But he also noted, ―Security subsists, too,
in fidelity to freedom’s first principles. Chief among these are
freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty
that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers.‖88
Boumediene had been preceded by years of criticism over
Guantánamo, where detainees had been brought deliberately to avoid
judicial review and to facilitate the creation of what had been termed
a ―legal black hole.‖89 Guantánamo had been attacked by America’s
allies, the United Nations, and non-government organizations, and
was widely perceived as undermining U.S. interests and counterterrorism efforts—a perception that led ultimately to President

85. Id. at 766.
86. Id. at 771.
87. Id. at 796–97.
88. Id. at 797.
89. Jules Lobel, Separation of Powers, Individual Rights, and the Constitution Abroad,
98 IOWA L. REV. 1629, 1666 (2013) (quoting 2003 lecture by British Law Lord, Johan Steyn,
Guantánamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2004), available at
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract? fromPage=online&aid=1523512).
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Obama’s decision to close the detention center.90 Habeas jurisdiction
provided a way to counter this perception and to legitimate the
exercise of government detention power through judicial review.
Although the right to habeas was grounded in domestic law, it
mirrors protections under international human rights law, particularly
the right to be free from arbitrary detention and from the torture and
other mistreatment historically associated with such detention.
Boumediene thus also reflects the Court’s understanding that
providing a federal forum for vindicating human rights guarantees
can further the nation’s interests, even where the conduct occurs
beyond its borders.
At the same time, however, the Court continued to view
territoriality as a constraint on federal judicial power. It emphasized
that ―[i]n every practical sense Guantánamo is not abroad; it is within
the constant jurisdiction of the United States.‖91 The Court
distinguished Guantánamo from Landsberg Prison in post-World War
II Germany, which was under the temporary authority of the
combined allied forces,92 thus weighing against the exercise of
habeas jurisdiction in Johnson v. Eisentrager.93 Boumediene thus not
only underscored the importance of territorial control as a factor in
determining whether courts should engage in review, but also
emphasized the exclusivity and permanency of U.S. control over
Guantánamo.
In addition, Boumediene suggested that the risk of friction with a
foreign government could provide a possible limitation on the
Suspension Clause’s extraterritorial application.94 It noted that no
Cuban court has jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel at
Guantánamo or those detained there, and that the United States is
―answerable to no other sovereign for its acts on the base there.‖95
Since Boumediene, a federal district and appeals court have
addressed the Suspension Clause’s application to U.S. detentions at
Bagram in Afghanistan. These cases reinforce the continued salience
of territoriality notwithstanding Boumediene’s rejection of a
90. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-PresidentOn-National-Security-5-21-09.
91. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768.
92. Id.
93. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
94. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770.
95. Id.
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categorical bar to the Constitution’s extraterritorial application and
demonstrate a skeptical view of judicial enforcement of human rights
violations occurring outside the nation’s borders. In Al Maqaleh v.
Gates,96 the district court held that the Suspension Clause did not
extend to Bagram detainees, with the exception of the small
percentage of non-Afghan nationals who had been seized outside of
Afghanistan and brought to Bagram.97 The court acknowledged that
the U.S. possessed a high degree of control over Bagram, although it
said that control was less complete and more impermanent than at
Guantánamo.98 The court also noted that the process that the United
States had afforded to Bagram detainees fell ―well short‖ of the
process provided to Guantánamo prisoners and deemed inadequate in
Boumediene, thus suggesting that the risk of arbitrary and unlawful
detention was greater at Bagram than at Guantánamo.99 The district
court, however, emphasized the practical obstacles in reviewing
detentions in a war zone. Such review might not only impact the U.S.
military mission but also cause friction with the host government,
particularly since a significant percentage of Bagram detainees were
expected to be transferred to the Afghan government.100 As the court
explained, ―It is by no measure unlikely that a federal court—sitting
in the United States and applying standards used in analogous habeas
cases involving Guantánamo detainees—would arrive at a different
result than an Afghan court applying an entirely different process and
legal standards.‖101
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that the Suspension Clause did
not extend to any detainees at Bagram.102 Applying Boumediene’s
functional test, the D.C. Circuit established a complete bar to the
Constitution’s extraterritorial application to U.S. detention operations
in Afghanistan. Like the district court, the D.C. Circuit emphasized
Bagram’s location in a theater of war and the potential risk habeas
review could pose to ongoing military operations.103 It further noted
the risk of generating friction with the Afghan government—a risk
that extended not only to review of the detention of Afghan nationals
(as the district court had concluded), but also to review of the
96. 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009).
97. Id. at 235.
98. Id. at 220–26.
99. Id. at 227.
100. Id. at 229–30.
101. Id. at 229.
102. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
103. Id. at 97–98.
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detention non-Afghan nationals seized outside of Afghanistan, who
were being held pursuant to a cooperative arrangement with the
Afghan government.104
Another war-on-terrorism habeas decision expressed similar
concerns with federal court adjudication of human rights abuses that
occur in foreign territory. In Munaf v. Geren,105 which was issued the
same day as Boumediene, the Supreme Court addressed the detention
of two U.S. citizens by the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), an
international coalition operating in Iraq.106 In their habeas actions, the
petitioners challenged both their detention by the MNF-I, which they
argued was arbitrary and unlawful, and their contemplated transfer to
Iraq to face criminal proceedings, which they argued was illegal and
would likely result in their torture.107 The Court held that federal
courts had habeas jurisdiction to consider the petitions.108 Although
an international force in a foreign country was holding the prisoners,
it said, the United States retained ultimate control and authority over
their detention, thus bringing them within scope of the federal habeas
statute.109 The Court also held, however, that federal courts could
provide no relief and that the petitions should be dismissed.110 It
underscored not only Iraq’s sovereign right to prosecute the detainees
for offenses committed within its territory,111 but also the adverse
foreign-relations consequences inherent in federal-court adjudication
of their claims, including of their transfer-to-torture claim.112
To varying degrees, these war-on-terrorism cases suggest the
continued salience of what Kal Raustiala has termed ―legal
spatiality‖—the principle that law and legal remedies are connected
to, or limited by, territorial location.113 Boumediene’s rejection of a
categorical bar to the Constitution’s extraterritorial application to
non-citizens in favor of a functional, case-by-case assessment of the
implications of extending a particular right to a particular location
indicates a resistance to bright-line rules based on territoriality.
Boumediene further suggests that enforcing human rights norms in
104. Id. at 99.
105. 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
106. Id. at 679.
107. Id. at 692.
108. Id. at 688.
109. Id. at 685–87.
110. Id. at 692.
111. Id. at 694–95.
112. Id. at 700–03.
113. Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2503 (2005).
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federal court can advance national interests, even where the violation
occurs beyond the country’s borders. But Boumediene’s emphasis on
the nature of U.S. control over Guantánamo—both total and
permanent—highlights how territoriality continues to constrain such
enforcement. The Bagram habeas cases demonstrate a continued
skepticism towards the Constitution’s extraterritorial application and
a fear about its impact both on U.S. military operations and U.S.
relations with other states. Munaf registers similar concerns, with its
emphasis on the potential harm to U.S. foreign relations if federal
courts were to conduct habeas review of extraterritorial detention and
transfer decisions, even in the limited category of cases involving
U.S. citizens.
The response of lower courts to civil damages actions arising
from U.S. detention and interrogation practices in the war on
terrorism reflects similar concerns about the negative foreign affairs
consequences of federal court litigation challenging human rights
abuses committed overseas, even where the gravamen of those
actions is against U.S. officials or U.S. defendants.114 These cases,
several of which have raised claims under the ATS, have typically
been decided based on state secrets115 or other justiciability doctrines,
such as Bivens ―special factors,‖116 rather than on extraterritoriality
grounds. They nonetheless reflect similar fears among judges about
the harm such litigation could cause to U.S. foreign policy and
relations.117
These decisions help place Kiobel in a broader context and
highlight parallels among cases aimed at remedying human rights
violations that occur outside the United States. Like Kiobel, the
decisions suggest that even where the Supreme Court has declined to
foreclose judicial enforcement through the adoption of categorical
114. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (dismissing suit against company for helping provide and operate flights used in the
U.S. government’s extraordinary rendition program, which involved the movement of
terrorism suspects among secret overseas detention centers for torture and other harsh
interrogation methods); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (dismissing
suit challenging plaintiff’s rendition to the United States to Syria for torture and other
mistreatment); El-Masri v. Tenet, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing suit against U.S.
officials and corporate defendants for their role in plaintiff’s rendition to and torture at a
secret prison in Afghanistan).
115. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
116. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396 (1971).
117. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1081–82; Arar, 585 F.3d at 575–76; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at
303–04, 312–13.
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rules, it still relies on territoriality to avoid what it perceives as the
potentially significant strategic costs of human rights litigation in
federal courts.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision ultimately to frame the issue in
Kiobel as one of extraterritoriality rather than corporate liability
suggests that its principal concern over ATS litigation centered on
judicial enforcement of human rights norms that occur abroad and
lack a significant nexus to the United States. This concern was
magnified in Kiobel, which threatened foreign corporations with civil
liability for a joint subsidiary’s alleged complicity in human rights
violations in a foreign country. The Kiobel majority based its
adoption of the presumption against extraterritorial application on the
perceived harmful foreign policy consequences resulting from
litigation that lacked a sufficient nexus to the United States, even if
that litigation was limited to a narrow category of universally
recognized and well-defined torts.
Kiobel’s scope, however, remains uncertain. Marty Lederman
has identified three familiar types of ATS cases that Kiobel appears
to suggest are unresolved: (1) cases alleging Sosa-sufficient torts
committed overseas by U.S. defendants; (2) cases such as Filártiga,
in which a foreign defendant uses the United States as a safe harbor,
thus preventing other states from bringing him to justice; and (3)
cases in which a defendant allegedly engaged in conduct in the
United States that contributed materially to a violation of a Sosasufficient international norm, but where that U.S. conduct alone is
insufficient to establish the violation (in contrast to Kiobel, which
alleged only corporate presence in the United States).118 In these
cases, future courts may be called upon to determine whether
particular ATS claims involving human rights violations committed
abroad ―touch and concern‖ U.S. territory with ―sufficient force to
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.‖119 As
they conduct this ―touch and concern‖ analysis, it remains to be seen
whether, and to what extent, courts will consider the potential

118. Marty Lederman, What Remains of the ATS?, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 18, 2013, 6:40 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/18/kiobel-insta-symposium-what-remains-of-the-ats/.
119. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
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consequences—adverse or beneficial—that hearing those ATS claims
will have on the United States.120
As described above, the Kiobel majority’s rationale for adopting
the presumption against extraterritoriality was the potential adverse
foreign policy consequences of ATS litigation.121 Justice Breyer’s
concurrence, by contrast, highlights the adverse consequences of not
recognizing an ATS cause of action in certain circumstances—for
example, where the United States might be seen as providing safe
harbor to a war criminal or genocidaire.122 Breyer thus acknowledges
that ATS litigation can serve U.S. interests. His opinion, coupled with
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which notes that the decision leaves
open ―a number of significant questions,‖123 suggests a continued
window for plaintiffs to argue and courts to consider the value of
ATS litigation to the United States, even where the human rights
violations occurred abroad. While a U.S. interest in human rights
norm enforcement—without any territorial nexus—will unlikely
provide a stand-alone basis for jurisdiction given the majority opinion
in Kiobel, it could bolster arguments for jurisdiction where there is
such a nexus. Future cases will have to grapple with unanswered
questions surrounding the required territorial nexus and, relatedly, the
degree to which concerns about providing—or denying—a federal
forum for enforcing human rights violations that occur overseas may
nevertheless be understood to ―touch and concern‖ the United States.

120. In one early post-Kiobel decision, the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ ATS claims
against a U.S. military contractor for its role in their torture and mistreatment in Iraq during
the period of U.S. occupation. See Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-827
(GBL/JFA), 2013 WL 3229720 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2013), appeal filed, No. 13-1937 (4th
Cir. July 26, 2013). In dismissing the claims, the district court narrowly interpreted the
Kiobel’s ―touch and concern‖ language and noted the potential harmful foreign policy
consequences of ATS litigation. Id. at *8–*9. The court, moreover, ignored the possible
benefits to the United States of exercising jurisdiction, particularly where the defendant is a
U.S. corporation headquartered in the United States.
121. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664–65.
122. Id. at 1674–77 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
123. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

